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Merleau-Ponty and Sacramental Gesture
Vincent Wargo
In this article, we utilize Merleau-Ponty’s notions of gesture, flesh and revers-
ibility as philosophical tools to explicate the corporal reality of ritual, incar-
nation, sacramental presence and the church as the mystical body of Christ. 
The phenomenological investigation of bodily gesture provides a founda-
tion to elucidate the meaning of symbolic presence from which we compare 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh with that of the patristic fathers, leading 
finally to its ecclesiological interpretation. 
Sacramental words and gesture are not simply the 
embodiment of some thought. Like tangible things, they 
are themselves the carriers of meaning, which is 
inseparable from the material form. They do not evoke 
the idea of God: they are the vehicle of His presence and 
action. In the last analysis the soul is so little to be 
separated from the body that it will carry a radiant 
double of its temporal body into eternity. 
—Merleau-Ponty, Faith and Good Faith (1946) 
Now that the theological turn in phenomenology is under full sway, it is 
an appropriate time to re-examine Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the light 
of what it can contribute to the further development of this field. It is 
strange that, like most phenomenologists of his time, Merleau-Ponty did 
not consider his thought overtly Christian or even necessarily theological 
in character. Yet, because of the emphasis that Merleau-Ponty places on 
perception, body and expression along with his original explorations con-
cerning reversibility and the intertwining of the invisible and visible, his 
thought offers us the tools to investigate both sacramental presence and 
ritual gesture. Merleau-Ponty’s thought provides an opening to see the 
importance of human bodily existence within the event of revelation and 
the importance of liturgical celebration. This paper seeks to show how 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology affords us a philosophical 
basis for understanding sacramental presence, the incarnation and the 
church as the mystical body of Christ. For the most part, we will work in 
tandem between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Christian theology. 
Beginning with the idea that our assent to the faith involves a judgment 
about the character of the witness, we try to show how gesture expresses 
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the character of the person. Next, it will be demonstrated why language 
for Merleau-Ponty, as a system of signs, is dependent upon the being of 
an incarnate subject and the expressiveness of linguistic gesture. Similarly, 
we sketch out how traditional theology from Augustine to Aquinas has 
tried to understand the symbolic nature of the sacraments within the dif-
ference between natural and conventional signs and how these are related 
to the connaturality of the human person. All of this is presupposed on the 
patristic account of the flesh as the mystical unity of the historical Christ 
and his church. We suggest how Merleau-Ponty’s notions of reversibility 
and the flesh could be used to understand the ecclesiology of the church as 
the mystical body of Christ. Finally, we compare Merleau-Ponty’s notion 
of gesture, flesh and reversibility with the position of Jean-Luc Marion as 
expressing the fullness of symbolic presence.
Let us begin by looking at the example of faith itself. In his Grammar 
of Assent, John Henry Newman argues that religious faith proceeds, in-
terestingly enough, by a sort of judgment. In order to accept the truth 
of the faith, the believer must freely judge it to be true or to be so. Yet, 
traditionally, what believers are called to judge is not so much the con-
tent of revelation, of which we have only a quasi-idea, since this is what 
in principle exceeds human understanding, but instead, the character of 
the witness. Usually we think of this in terms of the scripture or religious 
text being true, based on the integrity of the apostolic witness. How-
ever, if Christ himself is the Divine Logos, then he, in his person, is the 
revelation and he is also the witness. From this perspective a subtle yet 
profound change takes place: the revelation now becomes an incarnation 
and the visible and tangible world is the place of incarnation, the coiling 
of the visible with the invisible.1 We enter upon an essentially symbolic 
order. God is revealed not in an idea or law but in his very person, in his 
flesh. Our bodily presence to one another then becomes primary for the 
revelation. 
1We might say in the language of phenomenology that the incarnation is not only the 
“what” but also the Heideggerian “how” of Christian reflection and activity. French theolo-
gian Jean-Pierre Manigne suggests this possibility but articulates it in a vocabulary closer to 
Merleau-Ponty’s when he writes: 
If the incarnation is indeed the mystery in which the Word—“he who was from 
the beginning”—“came to dwell amongst us,” we may suggest, as one of the chief 
“marks” of this mystery, its character of mediation between the highest transcendence 
and the closest familiarity . . . this co-existence is visible and tangible. We remember 
the opening of 1 John—the basis of our message, our evidence, is not an intuition, an 
illumination, a common spirit, an idea of God or a worldly ideology, but rather a life 
which was touched, heard and seen; eternal life became a face, the mortal and risen 
body of Jesus of Nazareth.
This is to say, the possibility of the Church’s existence and mission begins with a 
person. As a result of this, the style both of the Church’s assemblies and the mission 
to the world cannot be immaterial. The incarnation does not simply determine the 
content or meaning of this assembly and their mission—it also determines their mode. 
See “The Poetics of Faith in the Liturgy” in Liturgical Experience of Faith, ed. Herman 
Schmidt and David Power (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973).
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When Christ declares that he and the father are one, this, again, is some-
thing that, as believers, one cannot judge in an adequate fashion. But what 
we can begin to judge are his gestures, and the gospels, if nothing else, are 
the account of Christ’s gestures. When, at the Last Supper, he breaks bread 
and says, “This is my body,” one accepts this, in the first instance, not for 
the reason that we understand the doctrine of transubstantiation, but be-
cause the gesture and words seem fitting or right. Merleau-Ponty explains 
how this occurs: words and gesture are never assumed under some ideal 
significance for a spectator; instead, the words take up the gesture and 
gesture takes up the words in such a way that they interconnect through 
the medium of the body, because the body itself is a system of equivalences 
and transposition from one sense to another.2 For Merleau-Ponty it is our 
bodily life in the world that gives us the means to understand why Christ’s 
or any ritualistic gestures seem fitting and how we can trust them. Because 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology places primacy on the perceptional life, 
it not only anticipates the importance of ritual gesture in its expressive 
meaning but can also be called upon to understand the significance of 
sacramental presence, ritual and festivity in general. 
The foundation for this runs deep in the structure of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought. Sense perception is itself spoken of by Merleau-Ponty as “liter-
ally a form of communion” in the sense of a kind of sacramental presence 
because it intends a real being.3 Hence, perceptual faith for Merleau-Ponty 
seeks to remain at the level of perception and does not retreat to the im-
manence of consciousness or reflection; it does not seek to replace what 
he calls “sacramental presence” with an idea or representation of it. Like-
wise, faith has its own perception: believers, participating in the rituals, 
embrace the actual gestures of Christ and not their ideal meaning because 
the gesture embodies a transcendent presence beyond mere idea. Ritual 
and Sacraments are the corporality of faith, but they can also be the stum-
bling block or barrier to every Gnosticism and to every imaginary direct, 
individual interior or illuminist contact with Christ.4 In Christianity the 
original gestures of Christ are collected to form the sacramental life of the 
Church, which both preserves and repeats these gestures in its worship 
and celebration. The Eucharistic celebration, which is central to Christian 
worship, is itself a ritualistic enactment of these gestures. 
In considering the liturgical form of sacramental presence, we can take 
our first clue from language itself and from common usage: liturgies are 
not merely watched or attended like baseball games or operas but are said 
2Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Rout-
ledge, 1996), 234–235.
3Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 212–213. 
4Louis-Marie Chauvet, utilizing Jacques Lacan’s distinction between symbolic and imagi-
nary, makes the point that sacraments, being symbolic, are an objective and intersubjective 
reality, i.e., a flesh, while the Lacanian imaginary, not being objective, is essentially individual 
and esoteric in character. The Gnostic desire to have secret knowledge or illuminations can 
be understood as the desire for an imaginary that can never be realized. 
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to be celebrated. By engaging its participants, the performance of religious 
rituals both establishes and transforms meaning and experience for their 
participants along with enabling their reflection upon that experience.5 
Every liturgy, at its heart, has the character of a feast, something affirmed 
and done for its own sake, and because of this, liturgies are essentially 
eventful in nature. They are in some sense an “Advent of meaning” in 
the language of Merleau-Ponty. Liturgies are celebrated by calling upon 
God’s presence, and we do this by remembering the gestures that Christ 
enacted. In fact, the liturgy of the mass is centered upon the re-enactment 
of Christ’s gestures at the last supper as he anticipates his sacrifice on the 
cross. These gestures, along with his words, invoke his bodily presence so 
that the event of the Eucharistic celebration consists in the manifestation 
of Christ through his gestures. Karl Rahner writes, “The sacramental ac-
tion too has the character of a word, it designates something, it expresses 
something, it reveals something that is of itself hidden.”6 It accomplishes 
this because the expressive, symbolic nature of liturgy, its language and 
gestures, are understood to be performative in character.7
For Merleau-Ponty the expressivity of gesture becomes the paradigm 
for the expressive nature of all communication. Inspired by Saussure, 
Merleau-Ponty asserts that language can be essentially productive in 
meaning and he distinguishes the speaking word (le langage parlant) as 
language which creates itself in expressive acts from the spoken word 
(le langage parle) as an already instituted form of meaning in language.8 
Merleau-Ponty argues that before language can be understood as an in-
stituted form of meaning, language must first make significations exist 
as guideposts by establishing them at the intersection of linguistic ges-
tures as that which, by common consent, the gesture reveals.9 Hence, the 
body as gesture is necessary to bridge the gap between linguistic and pre-
linguistic phases. This means that world and mind essentially overlap in 
the lived body for Merleau-Ponty. Or as theologian Louis-Marie Chauvet 
writes, “For every person, the body is the place in which the most internal 
and the most external meet or the external place where the internal finds 
5Bruce Kapferer, “Performance and the Structuring of Meaning” in the Anthropology of 
Experience, ed. Victor W. Turner and Edward M. Bruner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1986), 194.
6Karl Rahner, “The Word and the Eucharist” in theological Investigations Vol. IV (New 
York: Crossroads, 1982), 266 
7Jean Ladriére, “The Performativity of Liturgical Language,” in Liturgical Experience of 
Faith. Although Ladriére takes his inspiration from analytical philosophy, especially the 
thought of John Searle, it is still pertinent to what Merleau-Ponty says about gesture. Ladriére 
argues: “The performative verb is not a description of the attitude which its enunciation 
presupposes; its function is not to indicate the existence of this attitude, but is, so to speak, 
the attitude itself: it makes it exist in the effective manner by virtue of the illocutionary act 
underlying its enunciation.”
8Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the Prose of the World, trans. John O’Neil (Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1973), 10.
9Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, trans. Richard G. McCleary (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), 42.
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its structure. Such a structure is ‘symbolic.’”10 As symbolic, gestures must 
be understood not merely as the communication of ideas or inner states, 
but instead as visible, creative expressions of embodied life. They are 
what they signify. Merleau-Ponty not only wholeheartedly agrees with 
this statement, but he amplifies it, writing that, for human beings, every 
perception, every action is primordial expression.11 When confronted with 
an angry face or gesture, he writes, “the gesture doesn’t make me think of 
anger, it is anger itself.”12 Interestingly enough, this is exactly the function 
of a symbol over a sign as understood by the tradition. In a similar way, the 
performance of a sacramental gesture doesn’t merely make the believer 
think of Christ, but makes Christ physically present to them. Sacramental 
gestures, like all gestures, have the capacity to embody personal presence 
because they are what they signify. On the level of the body alone, the 
way we walk, whether with a fast gait or a slow saunter, discloses who 
we are. Even at a relatively far distance away, where we cannot distin-
guish our friend visually, we can recognized his or her particular way of 
moving. Moreover, our friends become present to us and we recognize 
them in their particular gestures. We may even seek to provoke certain 
gestures from our friends in order to enjoy their reaction. In connection 
with this idea, consider the account of the Road to Emmaus in Luke’s 
Gospel. Along the way to the town of Emmaus, Jesus appears to two of 
his followers. They discuss recent happenings in Jerusalem and, starting 
with Moses and the prophets, Jesus interprets the sacred Scriptures 
concerning his coming. But still their eyes were kept from recognizing 
him and it is only when they stop for the evening, and gather around 
table that they recognize him in the breaking of the bread, i.e., in the 
Eucharistic gesture. 
The study of ritualistic gesture itself proposes interesting questions to 
the phenomenological theme of absence and presence. Normally, gestures 
are one’s own; they are the bodily kinetic emanations of the individual to 
which they belong: gesture is the dynamic manifestation of the overall 
presence of that person. But in sacramental or ritual gesture, the indi-
vidual gesture is not a “possession” of the person performing it. There is, 
indeed, a double absence within this presence. First there is the absence 
of the one whose gesture it is. A ritualistic action may well employ ges-
tures that are part of the office of the one who administers these rites. The 
question arises whether all rites employ actions that have historical basis 
in the community and thus direct us to some original situation wherein 
they were enacted. The second kind of absence pertains when I mimic or 
impersonate the actions of another: insofar as the other is recognized in 
my portrayal, then I have to some extent receded. The better my mimicry, 
10Louis-Marie Chauvet, the Sacraments: the Word of God at the Mercy of the Body (College-
ville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2001), 20.
11Merleau-Ponty, the Prose of the World, 78. 
12Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 184. 
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the more the other appears in my flesh. Within rituals there is absence 
as well as presence, so that religious rituals can be viewed as memorial 
services. But they are not memorial services in the way the Veterans Day 
parades commemorate veterans, or in the way a photograph reminds 
one of the person pictured therein. These deal with the intentionality of 
signs and pictures, with which Husserl himself has more than adequately 
dealt. Yet, what is enacted in ritual is symbolically present and open to a 
kind of perception. Thus, different rules seem to apply. As Goethe once 
said, the symbol is the thing without being the thing—yet in spite of that, 
the thing.13 
Strangely enough, the congruence between Merleau-Ponty’s thought 
and Sacramental theology only grows the further we investigate the sub-
ject. Both lead to an assertion of something like the reality of the flesh. 
In order to understand this outcome, we need to recognize how their 
two trajectories mirror one another. For example, M. C. Dillon suggests 
that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expressive language offers a viable third 
alternative between the distinction of natural and conventional signs.14 If 
language is conceived as linguistic gesture, then the role of words, as signs, 
cannot function as entirely arbitrary constructs of meaning, nor can they 
be reducible to the onomatopoeia of natural sounds. Both of these assump-
tions are problematic, since the first begs the question of how meaning 
could ever be instituted while the second denies that fact of a plurality of 
languages. Alternatively, Merleau-Ponty proposes that all perception and 
expression takes place within the human person’s incarnate being in the 
world. He writes: 
I become involved in things with my body, they co-exist with me as an 
incarnate subject, and this life among things has nothing in common with 
the elaboration of scientifically conceived objects. In the same way, I do not 
understand the gestures of others by some act of intellectual interpretation; 
communication between consciousnesses is not based on some common 
meaning of their respective experiences, for it is equally the basis of that 
meaning. The act by which I lend myself such a spectacle must be recog-
nized as irreducible to anything else.15 
While the body is certainly the medium of both perception and expres-
sion, these are not reduced to the biology or anatomical organization of 
the body in a purely mechanistic way. Communication through gesture 
is not simply given, but instead understood as something “recaptured on 
the part of the spectator.” Gestures are understood and communicated 
through a kind of reciprocity of my intentions and gestures with those of 
others, so much so that Merleau-Ponty speaks of the gesture of the other 
13Tzvetan Todorov, theories du Symbole (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 239. 
14M. C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 
187. 
15Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 185. 
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as coming to inhabit my body and mine theirs.16 To understand the reci-
procity between one’s gesture and those of another, one has to work out 
certain equivalences. And here is where Merleau-Ponty draws a broad 
analogy between gesture and art. Painting, as essentially expressive in 
nature, is the working out of these equivalences of the visible that are the 
human person’s bodily relation to the world. Van Gogh’s painting “Wheat-
field with Crows” is not simply representing these birds in flight, but is 
showing what still must be done to restore the encounter between what he 
calls the glance and the things which solicit it.17 Whatever the visual style 
of a particular painter, this is his manner of gesture, i.e., the characteristic 
motion or interaction with the world which determines his vision. So it 
is not the object which draws movement from the eyes; instead it is our 
eyes, in the how of their glance, which characterizes shapes and carves 
out space that gives us an object. A great artist makes this expressive in his 
work so that even the master forger doesn’t make a “fake” as much as he 
does a study in the style of another. It is our glances, for Merleau-Ponty, in 
their synergy, their exploration and prospecting, which bring immanent 
objects to focus.18 We would not see anything clearly if the eye did not 
focus in this manner, nor could the mind in any way anticipate a field of 
objects as if it were working out a calculation. The visible world given to 
us in expressive gesture “undertakes on its own account to delineate what 
it intends and makes it appear outside, [it] retrieves the world in order to 
remake it in order to know it.”19 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we recognize the gestures of others because 
their bodily existence and the things they regard are never pure objects 
for us. What this means is that the presence of the other is not an object 
for absolute consciousness, but is rather, in the first place, an object for a 
perceptual act. This difference is important since objects constructed in 
consciousness tend to exclude one another, just as thetic acts exclude each 
other. For example, the conception of my consciousness as self-conscious, 
Husserl argues, must necessarily exclude the presence of the conscious-
ness of others, but Merleau-Ponty sees that this is not so for perception. 
In contrast, visual fields don’t exclude one another; rather they overlap 
each other, since the whole of me is not given to myself through pure con-
sciousness but through interaction of my body in the world, as Merleau-
Ponty has thematized through his examination of painting. This means 
that the other “slips” into my visual field, not on the side of an object, 
but closer to me, on my side, in the locale where my body is given to me 
reversibly as being both an object and subject in the world. This means 
that the other appears to me as oriented to the same world as I am. The 
goal for Merleau-Ponty is “to awaken a carnal relation to the world and 
16Ibid. 
17Merleau-Ponty, the Prose of the World, 65. 
18Ibid., 78. 
19Ibid. 
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the other that is not an accident intruding from the outside upon a pure 
subject . . . or a concept of experience among others but our first insertion 
into the world and into truth.”20 This relation of reversibility is at the basis 
of understanding gesture and the ontological structure of experience for 
Merleau-Ponty. 
Similarly, Christian theology has, from Augustine onwards, thought 
of the sacraments as signs either as sacrum signum or verbum visibile 
(sacred sign or visible word).21 Here what is emphasized is the visible and 
sensible character of the manifestation of what is sacred. Christian the-
ology has also faced the challenge of understanding the symbolic nature 
of sacraments within the difference between natural and conventional 
signs. Thomas Aquinas, who further developed Augustine’s doctrine on 
the sacraments, distinguished the material from the formal aspects of the 
sacramental sign. Again, following a similar logic, Aquinas argues that 
while the material aspect of the sacraments (water, chrism, bread, wine 
and actions like washing and eating) are not indifferent to the sacramental 
sign and do contain a signifying force (vim significandi), they are neverthe-
less ambiguous enough in nature not to perfectly express the true nature 
of the sacrament. Water, for example, from its natural qualities can be a 
symbol for washing and drinking. It is the formal aspect of the sacrament, 
the words of institution, which provides the needed criterion to stop the 
ambiguity.22 Thus, the words and actions of Christ are ultimately expres-
sive. This does not imply for Aquinas that the material incarnate being 
of the sacrament is superfluous. Quite the opposite: the physical-sensible 
reality of sacraments is necessary for the salvation of the person. St. 
Thomas writes, 
Sacraments are necessary unto man’s salvation for three reasons. The first is 
taken from the condition of human nature which is such that it has to be led 
by things corporeal and sensible to things spiritual and intelligible. Now it 
belongs to Divine providence to provide for each one according as its condi-
tion requires. Divine wisdom, therefore, fittingly provides man with means 
of salvation, in the shape of corporeal and sensible signs that are called  
sacraments. 
The second reason is taken from the state of man who in sinning sub-
jected himself by his affections to corporeal things. Now the healing remedy 
should be given to a man so as to reach the part affected by disease. Conse-
quently it was fitting that God should provide man with a spiritual medicine 
by means of certain corporeal signs; for if man were offered spiritual things 
without a veil, his mind being taken up with the material world would be 
unable to apply itself to them. 
20Ibid., 139. 
21Kenan B. Osbourne OFM, Sacramental theology: A General Introduction (Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Paulist Press, 1988), 24.
22St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, bilingual edition Blackfriars, (New York: Mac-
Graw Hill, 1975), III, 60, 6.
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The third reason is taken from the fact that man is prone to direct his  
activity chiefly towards material things. Lest, therefore, it should be too hard 
for man to be drawn away entirely from bodily actions, bodily exercise was 
offered to him in the sacraments, by which he might be trained to avoid  
superstitious practices, consisting in the worship of demons, and all manner 
of harmful action, consisting in sinful deeds.23 
Fundamental to understanding Aquinas’s answer is his insistence that 
the means of salvation be ordered to the actual existence and nature of 
human beings. Aquinas’s notion of Connaturality is pivotal in grasping 
how human beings are capable of understanding, acting and living in 
the world. 24 Connaturality suggests an ontological foundation, an “inter-
twining” in other words, of man in the natural world that reaches into the 
depth of his being. Thus, the whole of man’s incarnate existence, his being 
in the world and his life with others, becomes the place for the working 
out of his salvation. Sacraments are one part of a greater mosaic of salva-
tion for Aquinas. The Sacraments are seen as extensions of Christ’s mys-
tical body so that Christ himself in his incarnate bodily existence is the 
original sacrament of encounter with God. The Church understood as the 
mystical body of Christ, through its liturgy, is a further member of this 
same bodily presence. The early patristic fathers like Ignatius of Antioch, 
writing against the Docetists, spoke of this reality in terms of the “flesh” 
which should not merely be understood as the physical body of Christ, but 
as an integral matrix for the true appearance (givenness in being) of Christ 
and salvation. In other words, the fact of Jesus’s bodily corporeal existence 
carries with it a facticity which has theological implications. The “flesh” 
for Ignatius unites the body of Christ in an original temporality which 
links him back to the history of Israel and its covenant with God, forward 
to the soteriological end of man, and finally in the present, through to the 
operative works of the Church as mystical body through its prayer and 
sacraments.25 Urs Von Balthasar develops this idea of the Church fathers 
23Ibid., III, 61, 1 c.
24Connaturality is present both in the intellectual, moral and spiritual orders as the 
natural aptitude, affinity or sympathy of human beings for certain actions and ways of com-
prehending things. For example, because human beings are hyle-morphic, composites their 
minds have a natural inclination, stemming from their very operation, to know material 
beings easier than immaterial being. In the moral order, because of concupiscence, humans 
are naturally inclined to the pleasant over the arduous. In the spiritual order, it will consist in 
how graces to be bestowed upon them are in relation to their natural moral virtues. 
25Docetism provides any phenomenological approach to theology with a truly interesting 
foil, since it basically asserts that Christ’s bodily existence was sheer illusion or mere ap-
pearance, derived from the Gnostic opposition of spirit and matter. Thus, the meaning and 
reality of incarnation, crucifixion and salvation become radically altered or destroyed. The 
opinions of the Docetists seemed to vary: Christ either had no physical body or was an Aeon 
indwelling in a body; his crucifixion was either only the appearance of suffering or where the 
body of another was substituted for his. Because of this, Ignatius of Antioch used the expres-
sion “flesh and Spirit” forty times in his Letters to signify the two orders in Christ and his 
opposition to this heresy. The following are some of the most important examples to show 
the range of meaning for the term “flesh”: “Submit to the bishops and each other’s rights, just 
as did Jesus Christ in the flesh to the Father, and the apostles did to Christ and the Father and 
280 Faith and Philosophy
when he speaks of the spousal relation of Christ to the church as one of 
flesh. Here it is interesting to note that when Merleau-Ponty describes 
the unity of culture, the event and advent of meaning, he describes it in 
the manner of a body because this unity not only extends to individual 
members but realizes itself in a characteristically unique movement and 
style which is metaphorically bodily in character.26 In medieval theology 
the status of the flesh became elevated so that it was held to be eternally 
assumed by the Word. This simply means that the flesh is an intimate 
aspect of the essence of the eternal Word or Logos. In the economy of sal-
vation, for Aquinas, Christ acts as both priest and mediator between God 
and his people, a relationship, for Aquinas, which reaches in both direc-
tions. Essential to this relationship is the unity of Christ’s actions deriving 
from the unity of his existence as both God and man. When Christ acts, 
his human nature is instrumentally linked to his divine person so that the 
resulting act is sacramental. However, what is decisive for Aquinas is that 
Christ acts as mediator, not so much as He is God, but insofar as He is a 
person of human nature.27 
Next, I would like to look at the notion of the flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology as an important way of unpacking the theology of Sacraments. 
Along with this, I would also like to suggest how Merleau-Ponty’s ac-
count with its emphasis on concrete bodily life has advantages over other 
phenomenological accounts such as those of Jean-Luc Marion. In order 
to understand how this is possible, we need to go back to the notion of 
revelation as incarnation, where the body, in the words of Louis-Marie 
Chauvet, is the arch-symbol for revelation, the place for the living out and 
the intertwining of cosmic, social and historical dimensions of ritual. These 
insights are echoed in Merleau-Ponty’s own thought when he writes that 
the body is not just one expressive space among others, but rather “it is 
the origin of the rest, expressive movement itself, that which causes them 
to begin to exist as things, under our hands and eyes.”28 Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach could be useful in avoiding the hard opposition of revelation to 
reason as two mutually exclusive spheres because it suggests that the vis-
ible in its visibility is the place for the invisible. This insight suggests that 
the Spirit so there may be oneness of flesh and of spirit” (Magnesians); “Take up the practice, 
then, of a kind of forbearance and renew yourselves in faith which is the Flesh of the Lord, 
and, in love which is Blood of Jesus Christ” (Trallians); “Bread of God is what I desire; that is, 
the Flesh of Jesus Christ, who was of the seed of David, and for my drink I desire His Blood, 
that is incorruptible love” (Romans); “He is really of the line of David according to the flesh. 
. . . Immediately they touched Him and, through contact with His Flesh and Spirit, believed” 
(Smyrneans). See the Epistles of St. clement of rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, Vol. I Ancient 
Christian Writers, trans. James Kleist S. J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1946). 
26Merleau-Ponty, the Prose of the World, 81. 
27In Summa theologiae, III, 26, a. 2, Aquinas writes, “Now the fact of being an intermediary 
implies being set apart from both extremes; while, in order to bring these together the me-
diator bears what belongs to one over to the other. Neither of these elements is realized in 
Christ as God, but exclusively in so far as he is man.”
28Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 146. 
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much of the ground-work for the idea of “saturated phenomena” need 
not take place. I believe what motivates Marion’s approach, as he suggests 
in his writings on the sacraments, is the need for there to be a logos of the 
Logos.29 But would this not shift us into an account that would be more 
logocentric in nature, to some degree emphasizing and separating the spir-
itual from the carnal by employing a more Husserlian immanent account 
of perception? Merleau-Ponty’s contributions to the study of perception as 
well as of language and gesture bind body and mind in a primordial unity 
where ritual, prayer and liturgical action become inherently meaningful.
From the beginning, the world as flesh is structured according to 
potential lines of force which we discover only in our perceptual life; 
gesture finds its foundation in the flesh of the world by exploiting the 
visibility of the visible. For example, even before the infant understands 
the smile which it attempts to mimic, it has already to some degree recog-
nized that it has been addressed. The consciousness of the infant is turned 
to some degree outward to meet the world. Psychologists have shown 
that all expression or language has the character of it being addressed to 
us.30 This means that there is a directionality and reversibility to our being 
in the world. Heidegger refers to something like this directionality and 
reversibility when he writes that Dasein’s being in the world is always 
a matter of its concern or Sorge. In his essay “The Child’s Relation to 
Others,” Merleau-Ponty describes an idea of being which utilizes a rela-
tional structure. 
For Merleau-Ponty it is the thickness of the flesh between the seer and 
thing which constitutes the visibility of things as well as the corporality 
of the seer. The flesh is not an obstacle but the very means of communi-
cation.31 Similarly in the “Eye and Mind,” he speaks of seeing the tiles on 
the bottom of a pool: the pool’s water has its own characteristic thickness 
made up of its shimmering surface, reflections and ripples yet it remains 
the medium by which I see the tiles.32 To pretend that the pool’s water was 
merely a distortion which could be separated from what it reveals is no 
longer to see the pool as it really is but to inject within the visible some 
ideal structure. This sort of attitude is important for theology because it 
seeks to understand faith in the midst of the concreteness of lived relation-
ship in the world. As an ontological principle, the flesh is not constituted 
out of matter or mind or substance, but is the intertwining or the coiling of 
the visible with itself. Merleau-Ponty reminds us that the human body is 
a sensible for itself: it is color that sees itself and surface that touches itself 
29Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1991), 143.
30Paul Bloom, How children Learn the Meanings of Words (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000), 62.
31Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the Visible and Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 135.
32Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the Primacy of Perception, ed. James Eddie (Evanston, IL: North-
western University Press, 1964), 182.
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and as such it allows each of us to sense and to draw close to everything 
which is itself sensible. This onto-genesis of our body is the overlapping 
of these two-dimensions of the sentient and the sensible which in turn 
provides a depth in our access to things. The thickness of the flesh is first 
brought to light in the experience of this reversibility. The flesh of the 
world is founded on the reversibility of relations of touch to the tangible, 
and seeing to the visible and vision to touch. The hand that touches can 
itself be an object of touch, the seer can be seen. Yet, when the left hand 
touches the right hand there is no perfect coincidence between the two, the 
world intervenes. The world is given in the relation of the sentient body 
to itself.
For theology, Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility thesis, along with the no-
tions of visibility and invisibility, provides a fecund ground of possibility 
by showing the way we can proceed from phenomenon to ontology. On 
the level of perception, we can certainly think of the reversibility of the 
vision and touch which a sacrament or even an idol offers, so that the 
holy enters the economy of the world. Yet, at a deeper level, the revers-
ibility thesis can be helpful for understanding the mystical structure of the 
Church and how it is constituted in its ritual action and liturgy. The reality 
of the flesh opens the way for the grounding of anthropologies beyond 
structuralism to an anthro-socio-ontology where primitive or at least pre-
modern vision and visibility can hold sway.
To see how reversibility and flesh play a vital role in manifesting the 
reality of Christian theology and ecclesiology, we begin much as Merleau-
Ponty does with notions of the visible and invisible and how the invisible 
is “in” the visible as an inner framework (membrure), but this time given 
in the parable of the branches and the vine in the gospel of John. In this 
parable Jesus declares that he is in his followers and they are in him as the 
vine is in the branches and the branches in the vine. There is in this bond 
a living reciprocal relation, not only between Christ and his disciples, but 
to God as well, insofar as Christ is the servant of the Father (John 15:10).33 
We discover that the invisibility of the “in” is the abiding of love, agape 
specifically, which is so intimate that it can be understood only in refer-
ence to the abiding relation of Jesus to the Father which, in the language 
of Merleau-Ponty, is nichturpräsentierbar (unpresentable) and can itself 
only be disclosed to visibility in the relation of Christ to the disciples. So 
visibility becomes the presentation of the invisible. The effect of this mu-
tual abiding love is the building up of the Christian community to such 
a degree, says Jean-Marie Tillard, that to stand apart from this love is to 
stand outside the original agape of the Father and Son in which one must 
abide to be a disciple. “If you keep my commandments, you will abide in 
my love, just as [kathōs], I have kept the father’s commandments and abide 
in his love.” So by the very fact of being united with Christ, believers are 
33J. M. R. Tillard, Flesh of the church, Flesh of christ, trans. Madeleine Beaumont (College-
ville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2001), 15.
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incorporated into his Church and no longer live for themselves but for the 
Lord and for their neighbor.34 This example could be re-inscribed into the 
ontology of the flesh as an instance of the Einfühlung (empathy) where, 
instead of the perceiving-perceived, we have the loving-loved reciprocity 
of the love relation that creates a body, a flesh, which is shared and cared 
for by a community of believers. 
The reversibility thesis, however, enters more deeply into the flesh of 
the Church. The insight of Paul is that there is a mysterious correspon-
dence between the body given at the Eucharistic celebration and the 
ecclesial body of Christ. Jean-Marie Tillard shows quite clearly how this 
insight is taken up and further developed by Augustine, John Chrysostom 
and Cyril of Antioch. The ritual breaking of bread and sharing of a cup 
symbolized to those present their shared consciousness in their common 
destiny. Augustine teaches that the Church itself is offered in the offering 
it makes to God. He asserts this because, at a deeper level, he realizes that 
there is an indissoluble unity between the mystical body of Christ in the 
sacraments and the ecclesial body of the church. John Chrysostom sheds 
some light on this unity when he speaks of the metaphor of the two altars. 
The altar of stone upon which the Eucharist is celebrated builds up and es-
tablishes the ecclesial body of the Church, which becomes the altar of sac-
rifice that is pleasing to God. This means that the gesture of the Church’s 
self-offering is the reversal of the self-offering of the Eucharistic gesture, 
and with this the flesh as a spiritual reality becomes realized. According 
to John Chrysostom, because Christ lives and abides in the members of the 
ecclesial body, he is most honored in those deeds where members of the 
community are cared for, especially the poor, the sick and the aged. On 
the altar of the ecclesial body, which is the Church’s service to the poor, a 
reversal again appears; “What you do for the least of my brethren you do 
for me (Matthew 25:40)”; Christ emerges as the object of liturgical sacri-
fice. John Chrysostom proclaims: 
What profit is there if Christ’s table is set with golden cups but he dies from 
hunger? First feed him and relieve his hunger, then abundantly deck out his 
table also. Do not make him a cup of gold, and not give him a cup of cold wa-
ter. . . . Tell me, if you see him lacking necessary food and neglect to alleviate 
his hunger while you first set his table with silver, is he going to thank you 
rather than be indignant? Again, if you see him rapped in rags and stiff with 
cold and neglect to give him a coat while you build golden columns saying 
you are doing it to honor him, is he not going to think you are mocking him 
and consider it a supreme insult . . . ? Therefore, do not ignore your sisters 
and brothers in distress while you adorn Christ’s house, for they are more a 
temple than the other.35 
34Ibid., 20.
35John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Gospel of Mathew 50.4–5, in the Early church Fathers, 
ed. Philip Schaff, 10:313. Taken from Flesh of the church, Flesh of christ, 71.
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If the other appears as the temple of the divine, as part of the flesh of Christ, 
how should we relate to her and what can Merleau-Ponty’s thought add to 
explicate this reality? I think that the clue comes again from gesture as that 
which presents the flesh of the other. As Renaud Barbaras shows, the other 
is for Merleau-Ponty the originary presentation of the un-presentable be-
cause “it is in and as its body that the other appears.” Nevertheless, our 
perception of the other does not stop at the body as a physical object in 
some objective space. Instead, it is given to us in movement and in the 
uniquely singular style of the gesture of the other since the body of the 
other as flesh does not lie in opposition to its movement and gestures, 
but rather follows from and unfolds itself through them. The relation of 
visible to invisible takes on a new form for Barbaras: 
From then on, to the degree that the other is another flesh, the other does 
not distinguish itself from movements through which it is manifested; its 
invisibility does not carry it beyond its visibility and is thus preserved as 
invisibility. If the other is “more than the sum of its signs” which are visible, 
it is nothing other than them, nothing other than this flesh, and it is to this 
degree that the flesh can surpass itself as a simple object and bear witness 
to a presence.36 
So, for example, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the manifestation of the color 
red as more than a thin quale, but that which shows itself with a character-
istic thickness that relates to the rest of the visible. What is truly revelatory 
and what should be the object of faith’s vision are the unique unrepeatable 
gestures, not only of the person of Christ but of each of us, since they 
are purveyors to what is invisible and marvelous in each of us. Only a 
phenomenology which is at once an ontology of the flesh can serve as 
the ground for a theology of gesture. Since gesture is but the articulation 
of the flesh, which spontaneously emerges from the sheer possibility of 
visibility that is the flesh, it is an invisible visible. This is to argue that the 
sacramental gestures that constitute the liturgical life of the Church are 
not derived from any sort of a priori archetypal forms, but are the unique 
expression and style of a person. The sacramental gestures in particular, 
and all ritual gestures in general, exploit the potential lines of force that 
inhabit the world of the flesh in much the same way that Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that the drawing of a triangle exploits possibilities of geometrical 
expression. In this regard, John Henry Newman’s Grammar of Assent, 
can be understood as another way of directing the eye to this domain. 
Merleau-Ponty’s approach to vision, which seems almost to have the char-
acter of a perceptual faith, directs us to the concrete character of religious 
experience in a way that, I believe, other thinkers miss. 
In God Without Being, Marion, in contrast, speaks of the visible as the 
mirror of the invisible in light of the relation of the icon to the idol. The 
invisibility of the icon consists in what he calls the intention of the face. 
36Renard Barbaras, the Being of the Phenomenon, trans. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 259.
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The more the face becomes visible, the more the invisible intention of the 
face whose gaze envisages us becomes visible. The invisible receives its 
sense from relation with the infinite since Marion asserts that “the inten-
tion issues from infinity.” “The icon,” according to Marion, “can only be 
measured on the basis of the infinite depth of the face, the intention that 
envisages depends only on itself.”37 The careful reader can anticipate that 
we are dealing with the domain of the ideal and very quickly Marion dis-
closes that the infinite which determines the character of this intention is 
taken from the Cartesian notion of the conceptio dei as a conceptio infiniti. 
As he explains, the infinite for Descartes is in no way a graspable concept 
but is purely regulatory in its function. Although Marion clearly stops 
short of repeating Husserl’s attempt at trying to constitute ideal essences 
through recourse to Kantian ideas, it seems clear that intention and vi-
sion are modified by their reference to the infinite as a regulative concept. 
Marion argues as follows: 
The icon obliges the concept to welcome the distance of the infinite, hence 
indeterminable by concept; however, it is not a question of using a concept 
to determine an essence but using it to determine an intention—that of the 
invisible advancing into the visible and inscribing itself therein by the very 
reference it imposes from the visible to the invisible. The hermeneutic of 
the icon means: the visible becomes the visibility of the invisible only if it 
receives its intention. . . . The visible and invisible grow together and as such 
their absolute distinction implies a radical conference of transferences.38 
There is still a palpable sense of the dialectic to be worked out between 
the lines of Marion’s opposition and transference back and forth between 
the visible and the invisible in what can be called his attempt to overcome 
the “muddy tyranny of the visible.”39 To what degree can or does Marion 
want to escape the immanence of intentional consciousness to grasp vis-
ibility as flesh? Marion could probably respond, as he does in Being Given, 
that there is a difference for him between the notions of intuition and 
givenness, so that there could be, in principle, a range of phenomena of 
givenness to which no intuition belongs. In the end, it is not clear to me 
that Marion can restore the concreteness of the incarnation to vision and 
sacramental presence. In this light, the originality of Merleau-Ponty’s ap-
proach should be recognized as contributing a valuable insight into the 
materiality of Christian belief, especially as it affects our understanding 
of ritual and gesture as the foundation for further ecclesiological studies. 
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37Marion, God Without Being, 20.
38Ibid., 23.
39Jean-Luc Marion, crossing the Visible, trans. James K. A. Smith (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2004), 65.
